Introduction
The Agreement for Trade Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights (TRIPS) was ratified by a majority of the countries of the world in 1994 as a precondition to membership in the World Trade Organization. Today, 153 of the countries of the world are parties to the TRIPS Agreement. The effect of the TRIPS Agreement was to create the first international substantive standards of patent harmonization, and to cause many countries to adopt intellectual property laws far stronger than they had in existence at the time. Today, the process of patent harmonization initiated with the TRIPS Agreement moves forward, through a combination of multilateral discussions for a Substantive Patent Law Treaty and bilateral treaties and negotiations incorporating stronger standards of intellectual property protection than those implemented under the TRIPS Agreement.
Whether this process of international adoption of stronger patent standards is beneficial to all countries involved is a question that has dominated the international patent debate since the TRIPS Agreement.
Many developing countries have protested having to adopt stronger patent protection measures, and public health and access to medicine concerns caused by the rising prices of patented pharmaceuticals dominate the discourse around the TRIPS Agreement. All of these factors beg the question: Does a 'one size fit all' policy of international patent harmonization make sense to all countries equally?
From the experience of the United States, it appears that a strong patent system can be beneficial to the economic and industrial development of a country. However, the experiences of other countries has shown that stronger standards can even retard economic growth, instead of benefitting it. The purpose of this paper is to examine the economic and historic justifications of the worldwide shift towards stronger patent laws. In doing so, it also seeks to determine whether there is a case to be made for the alternative, a shift towards discrete levels of patent protection, where countries choose patent laws according to their economic, social and industrial needs, and not according to an externally dictated process of standardization.
The first part of my paper examines the history of patent harmonization, and current efforts to extend the process of harmonization further. The second part asks whether there is a stronger argument for each country to take its own discrete stand on its patent laws instead of staying on the harmonization bandwagon. In doing this, it examines examples from the histories of some major developing countries, as well as the history of patent law in the developing country experience. It also analyses the economic benefits of patent harmonization versus a discrete patent system. The third part of this paper compares the patent systems of India and the United States, two countries with distinct approaches to the use of intellectual property, and determines the extent to which the unique features of each benefit them.
I. The History of International Patent Harmonization

Multilateral Efforts Towards Harmonization
Given the dependence of any patent regime upon administrative systems, it is not surprising to note that the process of international patent harmonisation began with the Paris Convention and an international commitment to respect filing dates for patent applications -a predominantly procedural commitment.
Of equal importance, however, was the commitment of each signatory country to provide equivalent treatment under national patent laws to citizens of all other signatory countries, a step which established the groundwork for an international market for patents 1 .
The first step towards substantive harmonisation of patent laws, however, was not to come until a The SPLT is still far ahead in the horizon, and the current state of the art of multilateral patent harmonization lies within the TRIPS Agreement. However, the protections afforded by the TRIPS Agreement have been found insufficient by a number of developed countries, which seek to pursue higher standards of patent harmonization through bilateral negotiations.
Bilateral Harmonization Efforts
While the standards of patent protection required by the TRIPS Agreement were higher than those earlier adopted by many developing countries, they were nevertheless weaker than those accepted by the developed countries. With the surge in international trade in goods and knowledge, the need was felt for stronger standards than those afforded under the TRIPS. By utilising the flexibilities allowed under the TRIPS Agreement for countries to adopt higher standards than those specified in the agreement, the US and the EU sought to strengthen these standards through bilateral negotiation. 
II. The Argument for Diversity in National Patent Laws
Today, we live in a world where patent sytems are increasingly harmonized, with almost all national patent regimes moving towards conformity with the TRIPS Agreement, and many moving beyond.
However, there is a strong need to examine whether such a system of international patent harmonization that requires many parties to move towards stronger patent laws is beneficial for all parties. Although a number of studies have established a relationship between strong intellectual property regimes and economic growth 20 , others have determined that intellectual property regimes are actually detrimental to such growth 21 . It is proposed that one of the primary reasons for this apparent conflict concerning the effects of strong patent systems is founded upon an assumption that such effects would apply consistently across countries with vastly different economic, cultural and developmental backgrounds. Existing approaches to international intellectual property standard-setting follow the 'one size fits all' policy of creating a unified system of strong patent protection for all countries. However, a variety of historical, economic and social factors show, to the contrary, that such a unified approach towards intellectual property policy is not merely lacking in benefits towards certain countries, but may be detrimental towards them as well.
Historical Arguments for Patent Diversity
It has been noted that one of the reasons for the rapid increase in manufacturing productivity in the United States was a strong patent system, and its careful evolution to fit the needs of the American economy 22 . However, it has also noted that the creation of a system was the result of a deliberate and 
Economic Arguments for Patent Diversity
In order to determine an economic argument for patent diversity, it is important to understand the underlying benefits granted by a patent system. However, prior even to that, it is important to understand the basic assumptions made in evaluating such benefits. The first such assumption is that society needs more inventions than would be made if society did not offer an incentive to invent. The second assumption is that the best such incentive is the exclusivity provided by the patent system 35 . http://www.tripsagreement.net/documents/GATTdocs/erally_Internationally_Accepted_and_Applied_Standards_&_Nor ms_for_the_Protection_of_IP_-_Revision_E_E.pdf These assumptions, as stated, have not necessarily met with unanimous acceptance 36 . However, on the basis of their acceptance lies the foundation of the patent system, and the benefits associated with it.
MOSER, PETRA, HOW DO PATENT LAWS INFLUENCE INNOVATION? EVIDENCE FROM NINETEENTH-CENTURY WORLD'S FAIRS,
The primary benefit derived from the patent system consists of those benefits derived from inventions that would not have been made but for it. It is assumed by some that many inventions that constitute a genuine revolution in production or consumption patterns are patent-induced, requiring, as they do, large investments and high risks of failure 37 .
Ranged against this benefit are a number of costs that may accrue to a country from having a patent system. Donald Turner had listed seven cost elements that may be attributed to a patent system 38 . They inventors foregoing allocation of resources for basic research in favour of more the more profitable returns from the patent monopoly.
These benefits and costs play against each other to varying degrees in most developed country patent systems. The decisions of these countries to promote and strengthen their systems of patent protection indicates benefits outweighing costs in such systems.
However, decisions concerning the benefits and costs of a patent system in a developing country require a rethinking of the underlying assumptions concerning these benefits and costs. In addition to the abovementioned assumptions of the patent system (i.e. those concerning society's needs for inventions that would not be created without an incentive for invention and that the best such incentive is offered through the patent system)an additional assumption is required for a patent system to function within a developing country: that the grant of patents on such inventions will lead to development 39 . Due to the specific problems of developing countries, they are more in need of technologies that would improve the standards of existing and nascent industries and promote development, as opposed to those that would revolutionise 40 . The implication of this is that the former two assumptions concerning the patent system may require further scrutiny in the light of the latter.
In addition to problems concerning the basic assumptions underpinning a patent system, it is important to face the reality of the international patent system as applied to developing countries, namely, that the majority of patents granted in developing country patent systems are granted to foreigners 41 .
Given this reality, it is important to understand that the existence of a patent system within such a developing country would serve less to promote new inventions within that country than to extend protection to inventions developed in other countries, and sought to be utilised within the developing country 42 . As a result of this, developing countries would find that developmental benefits associated with a particular invention would be easier to obtain without the patent system than with it, and that, due to the list of costs associated with a patent system, the most cost-effective manner of obtaining benefits from an invention would be to reduce or free itself of restraints imposed upon itself by the patent system. This is the realisation arrived at by the newly independent colonies in lowering their patent standards to promote fledgeling industries and to encourage reverse-engineering 43 . An analysis of the history of patent law worldwide would support this assertion, with the experiences faced by developed countries in the evolution of their patent systems when they were at a lower state of development.
III. Comparative Study of Selected Factors of Patent Law and Regulation
An understanding of the benefits of tailoring patent regimes to suit country interests would be helped Utility India: The utility requirement in India corresponds to the requirement for 'industrial application', which, unlike the US requirement for utility, requires that an invention be capable of being made or used in an industry 57 . In interpretation, however, Courts have agreed that the parameters of an invention 'being made or being used in an industry' are broad.
United States:
In the United States, the utility requirement is more liberal, allowing for the patenting of an invention as long as it 'is useful' 58 . This requirement has been interpreted by US Courts as indicating that the invention must have some specific utility, and that such utility be disclosed at the time of patenting 59 . Beyond these limitations, however, the utility requirement is limited.
Obviousness
India:
The obviousness requirement corresponds to the 'inventive step' requirement, which was modified in 2005. The new inventive step clause requires the invention to have a feature that involves a technical advance compared to existing knowledge or economic significance, either or both of which should make the invention non-obvious to a person skilled in the art 60 .
The United States:
The non-obviousness requirement in US law declares that an invention is to be considered obvious if the an analysis of the differences between the subject matter and the prior art
show that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art 61 . 
Novelty
India:
The novelty requirement corresponds to the 'new invention' clause in the Act, which requires that the invention has not been anticipated by publication or use anywhere in the world prior to the filing of the patent application 63 .
United States: A significant difference between US and Indian patent laws lies in the fact that the US novelty requirement requires that the patent not be known or used by others within the US, but only that it not be patented or described in a printed publication in any other country 64 .
Administrative Provisions
Pre-Grant Oppositions
The Indian patent laws also provide more stringent procedures for the obtaining of a patent. Among the strictest of such procedures are those allowing for pre-grant oppositions, which allow any person to file a petition before the concerned patent office opposing a pending patent application 65 . The grounds obviousness 68 , wrongful obtaining of the invention 69 , insufficient disclosure 70 . The representation for a pre-grant opposition may be filed by any person, and is not limited to interested parties, allowing for the representation of public interest groups and other such parties 71 .
The patent laws of the United States do not presently offer any provisions for pre-grant oppositions. All oppositions that may be raised by a third party must arise after the grant of the patent.
Compulsory Licenses
Another important administrative procedure allowed for under the Act is the provision of compulsory licenses for the manufacture and export of patented pharmaceutical products to any country having insufficient manufacturing capacity and in order to address public health problems, provided that such compulsory licence or an allowance of importation has been granted by such country 72 .
Conclusion
The evolution of patent law within any country must proceed in order to ensure that the patent system is beneficial to its economic interests at every stage in its development. The rapid harmonization of patent laws worldwide, however, is beginning to ensure that countries have little scope for the protection of their economic interests. The objective of every patent system should be the promotion of innovation within its creator country. However, with stronger intellectual property regimes, developing countries may be required to invest in strong IP regimes to protect innovation originating in other countries, with little or no technological benefit accruing to them. While the TRIPS Agreement still allows for some level of flexibility in tailoring patent laws, the international patent regulation scenario is focussed on a shift towards stronger and more harmonised regimes, with the discussions concerning the WIPO's SPLT providing the multilateral push forward, and the incorporation of intellectual property clauses in free trade agreements providing impetus bilaterally.
From the experience of developed countries in their patent histories, it is clear that they have utilized their opportunities to adjust national patent laws to suit their needs at lower stages of development, and that they have benefitted from these opportunities. It is only through the utilisation of these opportunities that countries such as the United States and the European nations have reached a level of technological predominance. However, judging by the experience of developing countries under the TRIPS Agreement and beyond, it appears that this same opportunity may be denied to the countries that need it the most.
